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ABSTRACT 
Among countless atrocities, the Islamic State (IS) is 
responsible for wreaking cultural artifacts in Mosul and 
Palmyra. This paper enquire what actions Iraq and Syria 
could undertake under International Law to protect cultural 
property and to hold IS’s fighters accountable for their 
crimes. After analyzing International Humanitarian law 
instruments, the rules on the use of force, the UNESCO 
Declaration on the Intentional Destruction of Cultural 
Heritage and the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, it will be ascertained that several legal instruments 
could aid the two States. Why these issues are not 
addressed in practice will then be discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Baqiya wa tatamadad, lasting and expanding. This is the 
final objective of the Islamic State (IS): to recreate a 
Caliphate, covering the whole Earth, where the Sharia, the 
Law of Islam, will reign. In pursuance of this ambition, 
IS’s fighters have systematically attacked cultural property 
in all the territories they conquered. In 2015, they 
destroyed ancient temples and museums in Mosul and 
Palmyra in an attempt to erase the identity and the historic 
memory of their enemies, of which cultural artifacts are a 
living testimony. But what actions could Iraq and Syria 
undertake under International law to protect their cultural 
property and to hold IS’s fighters accountable for their 
conduct? 
 
THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF 
MOSUL AND PALMYRA 
Despite its name, whether IS is a State under International 
law is a matter of debate. To answer this query, it is 
necessary to refer to the Montevideo Convention of 1933. 
Art. 1 prescribes that, in order to be classified as such, a 
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state entity must possess a permanent population, a defined 
territory, a government and the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states. Considering that every 
successful battle for IS will extend the latter provinces 
while every debacle will reduce its territories, it seems that 
the second criteria of statehood is not fulfilled. As a 
consequence, IS constitutes a non-state entity under 
International law.  
The legal nature of the attacks in Mosul and Palmyra 
Generally, it can be stated that an armed conflict exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed forces. International 
Humanitarian law has traditionally distinguished among 
two types of armed conflicts, in accordance with the nature 
of the parties involved. Hence, if hostilities are carried out 
between two or more states they will be defined as 
constituting an international armed conflict; while a 
conflict between a state’s armed forces and (at least) one 
non-governmental armed group, or between such groups 
exclusively, will be characterized as non-international or 
internal. Another important distinction is the one existing 
between internal conflicts and other less serious forms of 
violence, such as internal disturbances and tensions. Two 
are the criteria used to guide this differentiation. On the 
one hand the confrontation must reach a minimum level of 
intensity. On the other hand non-governmental group(s) 
involved in the hostilities must have been recognized as 
‘parties to the conflict’: namely, they have to control their 
own, organized armed forces (Ronzitti, 2014, 137-150). 
Applying these rules to the destruction of cultural property 
in Mosul and Palmyra, it can be concluded that an armed 
conflict was taking place. For months IS had been fighting 
the Iraqi and Syrian governmental authorities with military 
forces, and the seize of Mosul and Palmyra themselves 
was accomplished due to the militants’ resort to armed 
force. Being IS a non-state entity, the analyzed internal 
conflicts between the organization and the Syrian 
government on the one side and IS against Iraq on the other 
side can both be prima facie classified as possessing non-
international nature. This hypothesis is confirmed when 
considering that the necessary threshold of confrontation 
for distinguish them from internal disturbances has been 
crossed. In fact, (i) both governments had to deploy their 
army to respond to IS’s actions, and (ii) the Caliphate’s 
military forces are well-organized, divided in hierarchical 
structure and capable of sustaining military operations. 
Methodology 
In the following Sections, a comprehensive analysis of 
applicable, international legal instruments which could 
help Iraq and Syria in protecting cultural property (Issue 1) 
and in holding IS fighters accountable for their actions 
(Issue 2) will be conducted. The same pattern of analysis 
is followed for each of them: first, their scope of 
application is tested. Secondly, their substantive content is 
examined. Thirdly, their suitability for addressing the 
issues at hand is discussed.  
 
THE UNESCO DECLARATION CONCERNING THE 
INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL 
HERITAGE OF 2003  
In recent times, states feel the necessity to create an ever 
growing number of norms to ensure the protection of their 
cultural artifacts. Among these newly created legal tools, 
the Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage deserves a special mention. It was 
adopted on the 7th October 2003 by UNESCO, in an 
attempt to combat this increasingly widespread 
phenomenon (Preamble and Part III Declaration). The soft-
law nature of this instrument must be underlined: its 
provisions are not formally binding neither upon the 
Parties to the Conference which have adopted it, nor upon 
any other state. Nevertheless, this Declaration deserves 
attention due to its significance: it is a sign of a new, 
emerging trend characterizing States’ practices in this area 
(Milligan, 2008, 101-2). Therefore, this instrument may be 
important to ascertain how the customary law related to the 
protection of cultural heritage is currently developing. 
Among the measures suggested in order to contrast the 
destruction of cultural artifacts, the Declaration 
recommends the states to ratify the HC of 1954, its 
Protocols and the ones to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
Furthermore, states are invited to undertake all appropriate 
measures to protect cultural properties, and their 
accountability for the destruction of these objects, even if 
caused by a failure to act, is promoted (Part V and VI). 
 
The importance of the Declaration for Mosul & Palmyra 
As highlighted at the beginning of this Section, the 
UNESCO Declaration does not possess any binding 
power. As a consequence, it cannot be of fundamental 
importance in solving the issues of the destruction of 
cultural properties in Iraq and Syria: it neither provides for 
an efficient mechanism for holding IS’s fighters 
accountable for their actions, nor gives a practical solution 
to the two States. Nevertheless, if the content of the 
Declaration was, in fact, legally binding, it would pose 
upon the two states the strict duty of protecting cultural 
property. Furthermore, it would make them responsible for 
destroying - or failing to prevent the destruction of- 
cultural heritage, hence further promoting the protection of 
cultural artifacts. Therefore, it would be desirable for the 
content of this instrument to become binding in nature: it 
could indeed be helpful in addressing the episodes of 
Mosul and Palmyra, as well as other similar cases. One  
way this could happen is through States’ practices – or usus 
- and the creation of an opinio juris sive necessitatis, namely 
the belief that such practice is require as a matter of law. In 
this way, the content of the Declaration would acquire status 
of Customary law, and therefore be binding upon every actor 
(North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany 
v. Denmark), 1969, 3). Nevertheless, since this step has not 
yet been undertaken, it may be concluded that the UNESCO 
Declaration cannot (as yet) be suitable to address the issues 
presented in this paper.	
 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
International Humanitarian law (IHL) entails the so-called 
Law of The Hague, traditionally focused on regulating the 
conduct of hostilities, and the Law of Geneva, which 
mainly addresses the protection of victims of war 
(Bugnion, 2001, 907-908). In the following sub-sections, 
solely instruments which could address Issue 1 and 2 are 
analyzed. 
 
The Hague Convention (HC) of 1954 
This Convention aims at protecting, safeguarding and 
securing cultural properties in times of peace and in those 
of armed conflicts (Art. 18 HC). This protection extends 
over the devastations of Mosul and Palmyra, since: 
• The HC formal scope of application (Art. 30-32) is 
fulfilled, being Iraq and Syria among its High 
Contracting parties; 
• The same holds true for the temporal scope (Art. 
33), the Convention having entered into force in 
1956 and the discussed devastations having taken 
place in 2015;  
• The material scope is satisfied as well (Art. 1), since 
the properties which IS damaged were of 
fundamental importance to the cultural heritage of 
every people. 
Turning to the substantive content of the instrument, 
according to its Art. 19 the Iraqi and Syrian governments 
should try to conclude a deal with IS’s fighters in order to 
enable a more effective protection of cultural properties. 
Nevertheless, this option is clearly not feasible in reality. 
Consequently, the HC does not result suitable in practice 
for addressing the destruction of cultural property which 
happened in Mosul and Palmyra. 
 
The Second Protocol (SP) to the HC 
Drafted so to strengthen the design of the HC and to 
address its main weaknesses, the SP was adopted in 1999. 
It is not applicable to the wreaking of Mosul and Palmyra, 
due to the fact that neither Iraq nor Syria are parties to the 
Second Protocol: as such, they are not subjected to its 
provisions, and hence the requirement of the formal scope 
of the instrument (Art. 40-42) is not fulfilled. As a 
consequence, the more comprehensive system of criminal 
responsibility and jurisdiction contained in Chapter 4 SP 
cannot be relied upon by Iraq and Syria. Therefore, this 
instrument is in practice neither useful for protecting 
cultural property in these situations, nor for holding IS 
accountable for its actions. It must be emphasised 
 
that the main reason for such unsuitability is the two States’ 
unwillingness to be bound by the legal instrument. 
 
The Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (SPGC) 
This additional Protocol was adopted in 1977, so to ensure 
a 360° protection of victims of armed conflict by extending 
the most fundamental rules of the law of international 
armed hostilities to non-international ones (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2006). This instrument does 
not seem prima facie to be applicable to the happenings of 
Mosul and Palmyra, since its personal scope of application 
(Art. 20-22) is not fulfilled: in fact, both Iraq and Syria 
failed to ratify the Protocol. Nevertheless, having acquired 
status of Customary International law, the provisions of the 
SPGC are binding not only on the Parties which 
voluntarily ratified it, but also on all other States, including 
Iraq and Syria (Cassese, 1984, 55-118). Interestingly, Art. 
16 forbids any act of hostility against cultural properties. 
Although this general prohibition against the damage and 
destruction of cultural artifacts indeed promotes the 
respect of cultural property, in practice it does not seem to 
be effective in holding IS’s fighters accountable for their 
conduct in Mosul and Palmyra.  
 
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
Following the horror of the Second World War, Countries 
all over the world felt the necessity of creating a 
multilateral system which could promote and maintain 
international peace and security. This desire led to the 
drafting of the United Nation (UN) Charter in 1945. This 
legal instrument definitively abolished the States’ freedom 
to resort to war, as well as any other military action falling 
short of war (Art. 2(4) Charter and Ronzitti, 2014, 25). The 
provisions of the Charter are applicable to the happenings 
of Mosul and Palmyra, since: 
• Its formal scope (Art. 3, 4, 110) is satisfied, being 
Iraq and Syria among its High Contracting Parties; 
• The same holds true for its temporal scope, being 
the Charter applicable to relevant situations 
occurred after the 24th October 1945 (Art. 110(3)). 
The material scope of the instrument is fulfilled as well 
(Art. 1-2), since IS has accompanied the systematic 
devastation of cultural artifacts with the killing and gross 
violation of human rights of the Iraqi and Syrian 
populations. This type of conduct can be classified as a 
threat to international peace and security, as it has 
happened before in the past (UN International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, 2016) and as required 
under the Charter material scope. Consequently, this legal 
instrument covers the happenings of Mosul and Palmyra. 
 
The Prohibition on the Use of Force and the Exception 
of Invitation 
As mentioned before, Art. 2(4) of the Charter poses a 
general prohibition to the unilateral use of force by UN 
Member States if ‘inconsistent with the Purposes’ of the 
UN. These include the maintenance of international peace 
and security, as well as the achievement of international  
cooperation (Art. 1). Nevertheless, exceptions to this 
general rules exist, both in the Charter itself and under 
International Customary law. Under the customary 
exception of invitation, the two states could request other 
UN Members to deploy their military forces in their 
territories. They could also authorise other states to resort 
to force in order to protect cultural property and to hold 
IS’s fighters accountable for their actions: these would be 
considered as lawful purposes, which would not breach 
any international law or duty. Of course, the invitation 
would have to be issued by the legitimate Iraqi and Syrian 
sovereign authorities, such as their governments (Saranti, 
2013, 185-187). Assuming that these requirements would 
be satisfied, Iraq and Syria could request other UN 
Member States to help them, by inviting them to dislocate 
their armies in the Iraqi and Syrian territories, so to engage 
in the use of force against IS. As a consequence, it may be 
concluded that the UN Charter (and the International 
Customary law related to the use of armed force) could aid 
the two States in protecting cultural property as well as in 
holding IS’s militants accountable for the destruction of 
cultural artifacts in Mosul and Palmyra.  
 
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT (ICC) 
Considered as one of most innovative and exciting 
development in international law since the creation of the 
United Nations, the ICC was established via the Rome 
Statute in 1998 and became fully operative on the first of 
July 2002 (Schabas, 2011, 20.) Having its roots in an 
international treaty, the Court will have to rely on the 
States’ voluntary consent for being able to adjudicate a 
certain case. Neither Iraq nor Syria are Contracting Parties 
to the Statute: as a consequence, its formal scope (Art. 125) 
is not fulfilled and the aforementioned instrument will not 
be applicable to the happenings of Mosul and Palmyra. It 
is important to underline once again that this is a 
consequence of the two States unwillingness to ratify, and 
hence be bound by, the Statute. Nevertheless, according to 
Art. 12, Iraq and Syria could exceptionally accept the ICC 
jurisdiction over the specific happenings of Mosul and 
Palmyra. If this hypothetical situation would materialise, 
the Court would be able to adjudicate the cases since: 
• The formal scope would be satisfied; 
• This holds true for the temporal scope as well, since 
the wreaking of the two cities took place after 2002 
(Art. 126 jo. 11 Statute); 
• The material scope would be fulfilled as well (Art. 
1, 5 jo. 8), since IS attacked buildings dedicated to 
religion, art and historical monuments -which 
constitute a war crime under the Statute. 
If the Statute would then be applicable, under Art. 25 IS 
fighters would be accountable for the crimes which they 
committed jointly. Furthermore, Art. 28 would allow to 
hold IS’s military and political leaders responsible for the 
events of Mosul and Palmyra, since it is inferable from IS 
modus operandi that the destruction of cultural property is 
encouraged, if not directly order, by them. Every State 
Party to the Statute would have to cooperate with the Court 
in the investigation and prosecution of these crimes (Art. 
86 and 89), and the ICC would be able to order the 
imprisonment of IS leaders and fighters (Art. 78). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Rome Statute is 
potentially suitable to protect cultural property and to 
address the destruction of the latter in Mosul and Palmyra, 
as well as for holding IS’s fighters and leaders accountable 
for their own actions. Nevertheless, before this could 
happen in practice, Syria and Iraq need to accept the ICC 
jurisdiction over the matters: otherwise, the Court will not 
have the competence to adjudicate these cases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout this paper, it has been ascertained that there are 
several instruments at international level which could aid 
Syria and Iraq in addressing the destruction of cultural 
property undertaken by IS in Mosul and Palmyra. There are 
plenty of provisions, scattered in different Conventions and 
International Agreements, which could efficiently tackle 
these issues. Why then, is this not happening today? It does 
not seem to be an issue of lacuna legis, as much as a 
problem of States’ willingness and practical difficulties. 
Despite the different tools provided by International law, in 
many instances the possibility of prosecuting the authors of 
the devastations is barred by the impossibility to exercise 
control on IS’s militants. In other instances, such as the one 
of the Second Protocol to The Hague Convention of 1954 
or of the Rome Statute, the instruments could have helped 
Iraq and Syria to address the issues presented. 
Nevertheless, the two States refused to ratify, and hence to 
be bound by, the international agreements. It is true that 
these have their own, intrinsic limitations and drawbacks. 
Nevertheless, in the cases at hand, it seems likely that if the 
two Government would consent to renounce to part of their 
sovereignty and transfer it to the relevant international 
institutions, such as the ICC, they would be able to 
successfully prosecute the destruction of cultural properties 
in the two cities. As a consequence, it may be concluded 
that there are several actions under International law which 
Iraq and Syria could undertake to redress the happenings of 
Mosul and Palmyra. Nevertheless, in order to ensure the 
protection of cultural property more in general and to hold 
IS’s militants responsible for the demolitions of cultural 
property in these two cities in particular, the two States 
need to recognize their inability to deal with the Islamic 
State on their own. They should transfer part of their 
sovereignty to the competent international institutions via 
ratification of relevant international instruments. 
Furthermore, together with the rest of the International 
Community, Iraq and Syria should promote the acquisition 
of the status of Customary law by the UNESCO 
Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage, being its content extremely useful for 
protecting cultural artifacts. 
 
ROLE OF THE STUDENT 
This Bachelor Essay was written as part of the Maastricht 
Research Based Learning Program for Excellence 
(MaRBle), offered by Maastricht University. The theme 
proposed by the Supervisors, Prof. Schneider and Ms. 
Tunsmeyer, was Art and Law.  Led by my passion for 
Islamic culture and the Middle East, I decided to focus my 
independent research on the topic previously discussed. 
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